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Abstract. !e previous studies have focused on weak institutional environment in explaining the 
growth of business groups in emerging economies. !e recent events, however, show that business groups 
continue to grow even when the institutions are ge"ing be"er. !is is evident both in the domestic and 
international growth stages. !is paper addresses this by providing a group and a  #rm-level analytical 
$amework as an alternative in examining the international growth of business groups. !e focus is 
pu"ing the institutional environment in the background and the business groups in the fore$ont. 
!e paper builds on the endogenous growth of business groups and proposes that their persistence, 
regardless of institutions and level of economy, can be explained not only through their environment 
but also by the internal dynamics of their organizational structure and group-speci#c advantages. !is 
proposition is based on the theory of the #rm through the combined application of transaction cost 
economics, resource-based and dynamic capabilities views.
Key words: business groups, business group advantages, a%liate-level advantages, internationali-
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1. Introduction
!e analyses of business groups in di"erent developing economies are well-documented 
in the literature (Colpan, Hikino, & Lincoln, 2010). A business group (also abbreviated 
as BG or BGs) is de#ned as a hierarchy of independent #rms, conceived to collaborate 
in domestic and international markets under a common administrative control; 
the a$liate #rms are linked by various social and economic exchanges of resources, 
interpersonal trust, and mutual adjustment (Granove%er, 1995; Le", 1978). In general, 
the transaction cost economics (TCE) theory, which argues that business groups will 
emerge due to the imperfections and incompleteness of the market, applies to the 
majority of the cases (Chang, 2006). Accordingly, the business groups are able to avoid 
the market imperfections by internalizing some transactions within the business group 
network rather than the external market (Le", 1978). !erefore, the creation of an 
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internal market provides the business groups with legitimate powers to exercise  control 
over their operations without heavily relying upon the ine$cient open market. 
In recent decades, the above application of TCE for understanding the organizational 
choice of business groups has been enriched by scholars. !is is through incorporating 
the concept of ‘institutional voids’ in the analyses. Institutional voids refer to the 
constraints that hamper the smooth functioning of the market. !ese are the absence 
of reliable institutions, standards and intermediaries, either so* or hard, which impede 
the e$ciency of the transactions between buyers and sellers (Khanna & Palepu, 1997; 
Langlois, 2013; North, 1990). !is new line of reasoning maintains that because of 
the existence of institutional voids, some institutional and contextual mechanisms 
will exist to support the growth of business groups (Carney, 2008). Indeed, some 
scholars suggest that since the strong competitive position of business groups in 
developing economies is a%ributed to institutional voids, the lessening of the voids or 
strengthening of the institutions can mean deterioration in the growth and expansion 
of business groups (Gaur & Kumar, 2009; Kock & Guillén, 2001; Strachan, 1976). 
However, recent research results and the existing growth pa%ern of business groups 
show a di"erent picture. Siegel and Choudhury (2012) found that in the two decades 
a*er Indian liberalization (1989-2008), when institutions were ge%ing be%er in India, 
business group #rms  on average performed be%er than non-business group #rms due 
to their recombination of existing economic inputs. !e same conclusion was drawn by 
Colpan and Hikino (2010) for some business groups in the East and Southeast Asian 
regions. Also, the recurring trend in the list of top performing #rms from the developing 
economies as ranked by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) shows that #rms a$liated to a business group continue to be on top of the 
list despite the many transformations of the institutions of the developing economies 
(UNCTAD, 2013). Hence, the overarching explanation of the growth and persistence 
of business groups should  by no means restrict the focus on institutional voids but must 
also include the ‘group-speci#c characteristics’. !ese group-speci#c characteristics are 
likely related to the ‘capabilities of recombination’ rather than the developing economy 
environment. !erefore, this paper contends that exogenous explanations, such as the 
institutional environment, are just types of environmental or institutional conditions 
which only serve as inputs to the growth of business groups and not the source of 
persistence themselves. 
In view of that, this paper argues that the growth of business groups in the emerging 
economies does not lie within the institutional conditions but on their innovative 
response to such conditions, that is, internalization of market imperfections and 
endogenous capability building among the a$liates (Mahmood, Zhu, & Zajac, 
2011). !is is consistent with the Penrosian theory of the growth of the #rm and the 
dynamic capabilities view (Penrose, 1959; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997; Verbeke, 
2009). Following this, the paper builds and theorizes on the business group-speci#c 
explanations rather than the explanation of institutional voids. Further, the paper 
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proposes that the explanation of the persistence of business groups, regardless of the 
type, location and level of economy, lies in the group dynamics and the functioning of 
its resources and capabilities. !ese group resources and capabilities form an internal 
market, where the competitiveness is being developed and exploited, and thus serve as 
the key explanation of their existence and evolution over time. 
2. !e emergence of business groups
!e emergence of business groups in the twentieth century is not a new phenomenon. 
Jones (2000), corroborating on the work of Chapman (1985), recon#rmed that the 
British trading merchants in the nineteenth century evolved into (and use the structure 
of) diversi#ed business groups in order to expand, both in geographic and product 
operations. !ese early business groups were understood as entities that intermediate 
between the ‘inter-country’ market imperfections and their a$liates ( Jones & Khanna, 
2006; Jones & Wale, 1998). !is pa%ern was also evident in the transformation of 
Japanese trading merchants, as part and parcel of the government’s policy towards the 
modernization program during the mid-nineteenth century (Kojima & Ozawa, 1984). 
In the developing economy literature the emergence of business groups is associated 
with the issue on the severity of horizontal and vertical incompleteness of the market 
(Khanna & Yafeh, 2007). In fact, some actually do not have any credible markets to 
start with. !us, the market transactions are deemed costly and the market system 
needs time to develop. In his notable work Leibenstein (1968) identi#ed two broad 
types of entrepreneurial activities which he termed routine and “N-entrepreneurship” 
or “new type entrepreneurship”. !e former means that the activities involved in 
carrying and coordinating the parts of the production are well known and operate in 
well-established or clearly de#ned markets (at least to some extent in the developed 
economies). !e la%er is the opposite, where not all markets exist and the entrepreneurs 
(or the economic actors of an economy) must #ll in for the market de#ciencies (ibid., 
p.67). To address this, entrepreneurial activities will make some portions of the market 
less impeded through extending markets but may make others more so through the 
creation of monopolies, or the creation of other barriers to entry where they previously 
did not exist (ibid., p.77). 
!e condition where N-entrepreneurship exists u%erly mirrors the entrepreneurial 
activities of #rms in the developing economies. !e #rms emerge to #ll a substantially 
high volume of gaps in the market network. !is is basically how the development 
of #rms in the developing economy is di"erent from those in the developed ones. 
Practically, the developing economy #rms choose to innovate their organizational 
structure, such as networks-like business groups, to respond to the multiple levels of 
market imperfections in the external market. !e seminal work of Nathaniel Le" on 
the industrial organization and development in the developing countries was the #rst 
to analyze this phenomenon. Le" (1978) reasons that the business group pa%ern of 
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industrial organization is readily understood as a microeconomic response to well-
known conditions of market failure in less developed countries. !e institution of 
the group is an intra#rm mechanism for dealing with de#ciencies in the markets for 
primary factors, risks, and intermediate products. It is an institutional innovation for 
internalizing the returns which accrue from the interactivity operations in the imperfect 
market conditions of the less developed economies (Le", 1978, p.666-668). 
!ere are other perspectives in explaining the antecedents of the business groups 
and their persistence. !ese perspectives look at a number of conditions which create 
supply and demand mechanisms for business groups to emerge. It can result from 
government related policies (Koike, 1993; Krueger, 1974), cultural embeddedness 
(Granove%er, 1995) and asymmetric foreign trade and investments (Guillén, 2000). 
Overall, the emergence of the business group structure is almost synonymous to 
the e"ects of the conditions in the developing market economies, coupled with the 
response of the market actors under such an economy. 
3. !e endogenous growth of business groups
3.1. e inuence of internal organizational structure on the growth of business groups
!e organizational structure of business groups di"ers from the typical single #rm with 
regard to treatment and governance of internal organization or coordination costs. In 
a single #rm, coordination costs arise from the interdependencies of internal markets 
within the single #rm; whereas in the business group, these coordination costs are 
ideally spread among multiple #rms (a$liates) within the business group structural 
setup. !is alteration develops due to the limitation of the coordination capabilities 
of each a$liate to function e$ciently in the developing economy environment. !us, 
the boundary of the internal organization of economic production is shi*ed from the 
single-#rm level to the multiple-#rm level, hence the (physical) growth of the group. 
!is phenomenon is again a%ributed to the market imperfections in weak economies. 
!is arrangement can be explained by transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1981). 
However, the bene#ts of organizing complex interdependent activities within the group 
structure, rather than in a single #rm, exceed the costs and risks associated with the 
various market imperfections and institutional voids in the weak economies. 
!ere are three dimensions that constitute the organizational approach to business 
groups. First, business groups organize interdependencies mainly with #rms and 
not with markets. !at is, a #rm can be considered as the #rst-order hierarchy, i.e. 
U-form and M-form (Chandler, 1990; Williamson, 1981), while the business group is 
treated as the second-order hierarchy, i.e. hierarchy of hierarchies. With this setup, an 
intermediate if not full or centralized control is also necessary. !e assumption is that 
when #rms face limitations and overwhelming market imperfections, business group 
level arrangement is chosen. !is is because the business group approach recognizes 
that market imperfections reside at multiple levels of economic coordination, and some 
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are simply beyond the natural immunity of a single #rm. !is is aggravated if and when 
the compounding group versus group competitive tendencies dominate the market. 
Hence, in certain markets #rms belonging to a business group are be%er o" than single 
#rms (Khanna & Rivkin, 2001). 
Second, the governance mechanism of a business group takes account of core 
(hierarchy-type collaboration) and non-core integration (market-type collaboration). 
!ese core and non-core integration mechanisms are strategic, with the goal to 
develop, appropriate and control tangible and intangible group-speci#c advantages. 
Core integration is the basic organizational structure of a business group by which 
elite independent #rms are pooled and coordinated. Here we see related and unrelated 
portfolios being specialized and entrusted to the core elite a$liate #rms (Demsetz, 
1988). Hence not all a$liates share the same operations. On the other hand, non-core 
integration is the structural extension of core #rms that comprises the non-core a$liate 
#rms and markets. !is is where the core elite #rms and the rest of the group engage 
in joint ventures, strategic alliances, licensing and other extended social and economic 
exchanges. !ese transactions can be domestic, regional and even global depending 
on the characteristic of the a$liate #rm, i.e. domestic or multinational. !e control in 
this setup can be intermediate and decentralized, but not totally independent. Here 
core and non-core a$liate #rms are given fair discretion with regard to external mode 
governance. !is is how the boundaries of the a$liate #rms are set at the margin where 
the bene#ts of further internalization o"set the cost (social and economic). 
!e consideration as to how the two dimensions above are made possible in a 
business group leads us to the third point, which is control.  !e control in business 
groups focuses on two binding aspects: (1) ownership (e.g., cross-holding) and (2) 
intermediation in the internal transactions (e.g., director interlocks).  Ownership in BGs 
belongs to one of the three types of arrangement:  family-owned, widely-held, or state-
owned (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006). Family-owned refers to a family or its members directly 
controlling the business; sometimes without hiring an outsider manager to run the 
enterprise. !is is the most common type of BGs, especially those from ever-developing 
markets, i.e. South Korean Chaebols, Southeast Asian BGs and Indian BGs. In cases where 
a hired manager is necessary, family members or their kin still make most of the decisions. 
For widely-held BGs, ownership is widely dispersed among multiple shareholders and 
mostly publicly listed. Lastly, state-owned BGs are a unique type of organization as they 
are clearly reliant on the intervention of the state. !ese BGs are mostly from previously 
centrally planned economies like China and Russia (Abegaz, 2005). !ey function as the 
market arm of the state and occupy a larger chunk of the state’s business operations. 
On the other hand, the intermediation in internal transaction of BGs follows a loose-
coupled system, where there is both distinctiveness and responsiveness (Orton & Weick, 
1990). It is a combination of e$ciency responses and mere preference. Group a$liates 
are interdependent in facilitating coordination, control and external intermediation. Yiu 
et al. (2007) suggest that within-group adaptive a%ributes of BG interdependencies take 
into account two dimensions: horizontal and vertical linkages. Horizontal connections 
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consist of an internal transactions mechanism, which refers to internalization and allocation 
of critical resources and information among BG a$liates. On the one hand, the vertical 
mechanism of a BG functions and echoes the command chain of the group from the 
dominant owners to the a$liates. Dominant owners are the Core owner elite, an individual 
or an entity (i.e. an a$liate #rm), or a collection of individuals/organizations having 
the dominant share and control over the BG parent company and/or core companies 
of the business group. Companies in the vertical hierarchy would have the apex #rm/
headquarters, a holding company, strategic business units and operational a$liates. 
3.2. e group-speci!c advantages as catalysts of business group’s growth
In emerging economies the advantages of  the #rms a$liated to a business group arise 
from the interaction of and response to speci#c country characteristics, imperfections 
in capital, labor and product markets, and the recombination capabilities of the a$liate 
#rms (Chang & Choi, 1988; Chang & Hong, 2000; Le", 1978). !ese advantages 
are supported by the accumulated knowledge that has been captured, owned and 
controlled by the business group over time (Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Mahmood et 
al., 2011). !is paper calls these advantages the Business Group Advantages (here also 
abbreviated as BGAs) as they accrue exclusively to business group-a$liated #rms. !e 
BGAs are internalized and found within the business group structure and stored at the 
group level. Since a business group is composed of independent a$liate #rms, BGAs, 
in theory, can be found within each a$liate #rm. !erefore, BGAs have two levels, one 
is the group as a whole and the other is at the individual a$liate level. Both facilitate the 
dynamic growth and persistence of the business group.
3.2.1. The impact of group-level advantages
!ere are three generic components to describe the competitive structure of business 
group advantages. !e #rst is reduced transactions costs through the group internal 
capital, labor, internal buying and selling, and market information search. !is 
explains the incentive of reducing the risks and costs from searching or developing 
information and advantages in the external market (Le", 1978; Williamson, 1981). 
!e business group structure provides an array of internal resources, which an 
a$liate can exploit. !e most common example is the internal group capital that is 
a very good source of capitalization for a$liates in times of investments, including 
foreign investments, and expansion (Gonenc, Kan, & Karadagli, 2007). !e second 
component includes transferable group managerial skills and experience in product 
and geographical diversi#cation, contacts and intermediation capabilities, and state 
relations. !ese advantages provide a combination of context speci#c and transferable 
skills among BG a$liates (Tan & Meyer, 2010). Amsden and Hikino (1994) argue that 
the repeated industry-entry pa%ern of business groups was realized because of their 
“contact capabilities” with the state and foreign multinationals, followed by “project 
execution capabilities”. According to them, these project execution capabilities refer 
“to the skills required to establish or expand operating and other corporate facilities, 
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including undertaking preinvestment feasibility studies, project management, project 
engineering, procurement, construction and startup operations”. !ese capabilities 
are generic to business groups and not industry-speci#c. In addition, business group 
experience in management of product and geographic diversi#cation directly aid other 
a$liates in other potential product areas and locational expansions (Kim, Hoskisson, 
Tihanyi, & Hong, 2004). 
!e last component is the economies of scale and scope such as allocation and co-
development of resources in the area such as in R&D and technology, marketing and 
distribution, group brand and reputation (Chandler, 1990). A successful processing 
system that is developed by one a$liate may, at one point or another, be useful to 
another a$liate for benchmarking. Lead times and costs are reduced through this 
approach. Another important and unique BGA is group reputation. Group a$liates 
enjoy the ease of winning contracts or projects only because of their membership in a 
reputable business group. A business group might have a very long successful history 
of operations and transactional negotiations that create a positive halo e"ect on all the 
a$liates in the group. 
3.2.2. The dynamics of affiliate-level resources and capabilities
!e business group-level advantage explains what kinds of advantages are found at the 
group level, but it does not explain all the potential advantages that are found at the 
individual a$liate level. !ese a$liate level advantages contribute to the growth of the 
business group by strengthening the overall resources and advantages of the group. !is 
paper proposes that what individual BG a$liates have are both the subset of the BGAs 
and A%liate-level Advantages (here also abbreviated as ALAs). By building on BGAs, 
a$liate #rms can develop speci#c advantages independently. !ese advantages are 
unique resources, capabilities and strengths speci#c to an a$liate #rm (Barney, 1991). 
!e bundle of these BGAs and ALAs is a function of the recombination capabilities 
by the individual a$liates (Teece et al., 1997; Verbeke, 2009). It de#nes the overall 
advantage of each individual a$liate as well as the heterogeneity of the a$liates within 
a business group (Rugman & Verbeke, 1992). !e variance among ALAs occurs due 
to the level and extent of BGA recombination by each a$liate, that is, some a$liates 
operationalize or depend on BGAs more than others. !is is because each a$liate has 
speci#c objectives, roles, operational scope and, eventually, competitiveness. Hence, 
the a$liates can use the group structure to complement for the missing and potential 
advantages (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Lavie, 2006; Mahmood et al., 2011).
4. !e growth of emerging economy business groups across borders
4.1. Initial internationalization growth stage
!e international growth of business groups from emerging economies has been 
studied for quite a while. However, the results are inconclusive. Speci#cally, the issue 
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on the advantages of business groups has been cited as the rationale for both success 
and failure, but the dimension in which these advantages are based is completely 
lacking(see, e.g., Hoskisson, Johnson, Tihanyi, & White, 2005; Lall, 1983; Pananond 
& Zeithaml, 1998). !is paper argues that the fundamental approach to understand 
the nature and extent of the international growth of business groups is through their 
business group advantages, i.e. the extent to which they share or bene#t with the 
strategic resources and capabilities of the business group while growing across borders. 
!is can be determined by looking at the extent to which a$liates are dependent on 
BGAs. As such, the greater the reliance on BGAs, the stronger the relationship of an 
a$liate with the business group; or the more an a$liate #rm explores and exploits 
group resources (the knowledge captured and owned by the group), the more they 
can bene#t from the group structure. !e practical way to validate this approach is to 
illustrate the international development stages of the business groups through time.
!e business group a$liates rely on their business group when deciding to enter 
a new market and even more so in entering an international market. !e necessity of 
having knowledge about new markets is tantamount in their strategic intent or entering 
into a new venture. As practiced, this knowledge can be acquired at the group level 
for strategic reasons. !e most direct is that some of the BG a$liates of the business 
groups have already done it before and some are even operating in that same market. 
!eir experiences and familiarity are expected to be channeled back to the group for 
benchmarking. Another obvious reason why BG a$liates rely upon their business 
groups is access to capital which is controlled at the group level or their group holding 
companies. !e BG a$liates prefer to secure their capital requirement within the group 
rather than taking a higher risk of negotiating with an external #nancial provider. Hence, 
in the internationalization and initial stage of operations of BG a$liates, reliance on 
BGAs is very important considering the liability of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995) of the 
new market or venture. In short, business group a$liates may not possess strong a$liate 
level advantages at the initial stage of international operations. 
Proposition 1: !e initial international expansion growth of business group 
a%liates $om emerging economies is signi#cantly in&uenced by their 
reliance on business group advantages. !e weaker their ALAs, the 
higher their reliance on BGAs.
4.2. International development stage
As the business group a$liates continue to share signi#cant support from their business 
group, they also advance their own a$liate-level advantages in the development stage. 
However, the quality of ALAs ma%ers a lot here, beyond BGAs, due to the presence 
of location and non-location bound assets. !ese assets are the advantages that can 
be acquired by the a$liates in the host countries (Rugman & Verbeke, 1992). As a 
response, BG a$liates start to learn and acquire other capabilities which are very 
30 
important in their operations. !e business group a$liates recognize that they must 
evolve according to what they foresee as an important arrangement between their 
internal characteristics and the external system enabling them to achieve independent 
growth (Penrose, 1959). !is is strategic in order to keep its pace with other #rms or 
multinationals. Clearly, the only way for the BG a$liates to survive in the competition 
with incumbent multinationals is to develop superior or comparative speci#c advantages 
through the combination of external and internal resources and capabilities. 
Proposition 2: In the development stage as business group a%liate multinationals, 
the higher the pressure for internalizing and exploiting non-location-
bound assets in the host countries, the higher their reliance on BGAs
4.3. Mature stage
A #rm’s organizational structure is the result of its interaction with its direct environment 
(Nelson & Winter, 1982; Sco%, 2001). !e #rms have their own ways of blending 
with their institutional environment for the sake of legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983). In the case of the business group a$liates, operating in other countries means 
more di$culties compared to the traditional organizations in terms of legitimacy and 
organizational management. !e reason is that business groups are embedded in a 
multilevel inter-organizational structure in their home and host countries more than the 
typical single #rms (Kostova, Roth, & Dacin, 2008). !is multilevel structure contains 
vertical and horizontal ties bonded by formal and informal relationships between 
individuals and #rms. !is is also heightened when transactions within the group are 
becoming far too many to handle. Indeed, the implication of this multilevel business 
group structure is inherently complicated (Granove%er, 2005). However, if there is a 
sound and dynamic governance framework in place, the probability that business group 
advantages remain to complement the BG a$liates exists even in the mature stage of 
its operations ( Jones, Hesterly, & Borga%i, 1997). Nonetheless, the ultimate trajectory 
lies on the signi#cance of the long-term goal of a BG a$liate as a multinational and the 
whole business group in general. In the end, the in=uence of home-host environmental 
factors determines the BG a$liate’s level advantages and de#nes their competitive 
position in the global environment (Bartle% & Ghoshal, 1987).
Proposition 3:  As business group a%liate multinationals operate in other 
economies apart $om the emerging market environment, they face 
high institutional pressures. !e higher the pressures, the higher their 
reliance on BGAs and ALAs.
5. !eoretical implications, research limitations and future direction
!e analyses of business groups have been predominantly domestic in orientation. !us 
far, business groups are well understood as domestic groups of interdependent #rms, 
collaborating as well as competing with multinationals in their home country. !ey are 
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not seen as international #rms or global players despite their international activities in 
inter-regional markets and even in advanced economies. As a ma%er of fact, business 
groups have already evolved along with their home country institutions and developed 
some internationally transferable resources and capabilities (Ramamurti, 2012). What 
is lacking, however, is the explanation on how these accumulated advantages become 
signi#cant if the business groups intend to grow globally or compete with other 
multinational enterprises in di"erent regional markets. !erefore, this paper contributes 
towards understanding this gap. It argues that the business group organizational structure 
and advantages are the fundamental point of departure in explaining the business groups’ 
international expansion and competitiveness. It departs from the existing literature by 
building on the internal dynamics of business group advantages rather than on the 
external institutions in the emerging economies. In addition, the explanation of how 
and why business groups exist in international markets is categorically understudied 
compared to their domestic trajectories (Delios & Ma, 2010). !e paper shows that this 
can be analyzed in di"erent international growth stages. !is is a considerable gap in the 
literature that, if addressed, brings new insights not only in understanding business group 
internationalization but also in the debate about how business-a$liated multinationals 
can di"er from conventional multinationals from other economies, especially the 
advanced ones. It can also open some new arguments on how international entry modes 
like exports, joint ventures and wholly owned subsidiaries are carried when business 
groups are the major actors.
Although this paper is robust in theoretical grounding, it has clear limitations on 
the empirical testing. One of the reasons for this is the limited number of business 
groups which could provide a generalized result in testing the concepts of this paper. 
Nevertheless, this study provides a lens on how to foresee the growth of business 
groups both in their domestic and international dimensions. On the other hand, there 
is enormous potential to expand this study. Firstly, using the concept of BGAs and 
ALAs, the business organizations in emerging markets can now be clearly classi#ed 
into business groups and non-business groups. By this, the growth pa%ern of the two 
types of organizations can be di"erentiated. As a result, the analysis of organizations 
in emerging markets can also be done at the group level. !e analysis can even be 
conceptualized at the global level where the internal business group dynamics will be 
measured not only from business group and a$liate levels but also including all the 
foreign subsidiaries across countries. Secondly, the existing literature of business groups 
has focused on Asia and Latin America. But, by broadening the scope of emerging 
economies, which include Africa and the transitioning eastern European economies, a 
consistent theoretical analysis can be applied. For example, the #rms in these economies 
can be analyzed with regard to how they respond to market imperfections as their 
economic and political institutions are still developing. !e #rms are the key drivers of 
the development of markets which then boosts economic development and catch-up.
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In sum, the organizations in the emerging economies, such as the business 
groups, are evolving faster than ever. !is evolution blurs the boundaries of the #rms, 
requiring more in-depth analysis to understand their nature. !is research contributes 
to the conversation by focusing on endogenous growth, which provides a more 
realistic perspective, as an alternative to the traditional institutional analysis.When 
incorporating the concepts and propositions of this research into the wider dialogue on 
emerging market #rms, it will result in a more comprehensive picture of the ecology of 
organizations in the emerging economies. 
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